Bank Stress Tests

Financial Times  Aug 29  Comment 
MarketWatch  Aug 23  Comment 
The stock market will be put to a rigorous stress test in September with the month holding the record as among the worst for Wall Street.
SeekingAlpha  Aug 20  Comment 
Channel News Asia  Jul 18  Comment 
Morgan Stanley reported a 43 percent rise in quarterly profit on Wednesday, helped by increase in revenue from its trading and investment banking businesses.
Euromoney  Jul 16  Comment 
Deutsche Bank’s failure of the recent Federal Reserve stress tests drew attention, but while the regulator was happy to kick the battered European bank while it is down, this was in stark contrast to its treatment of favoured home-town players...
Financial Times  Jul 12  Comment 
Banks will have to pass comprehensive ECB stress tests
The Economic Times  Jul 12  Comment 
The stress test pertains to Minimum Required Corpus (MRC) of core Settlement Guarantee Fund (SGF).
Yahoo  Jul 9  Comment 
Jul.09 -- Bloomberg's Sonali Basak reports on what the results of the Federal Reserve's stress tests on big banks signal about the prospects for big deals. She speaks on "Bloomberg Markets."
Motley Fool  Jul 5  Comment 
There weren’t many big surprises this year, but here’s what you need to know.


A stress test is an assessment or evaluation of a bank's balance sheet to determine if it is viable as a business or likely to go bankrupt instead. It is a colloquial term often used in relation to the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), a forward-looking appraisal of capital conducted by the Federal Reserve and thrift supervisors to determine if the 19 largest financial institutions in the U.S. have sufficient capital buffers to withstand the recession and financial crisis. Regulators chose Tier 1 common capital as the yardstick to assess capital levels, although it was originally thought that they would use tangible common equity.[1][2]


The assessment was limited to bank holding companies with assets exceeding $100 billion. In order of decreasing assets, the 19 institutions tested were:

The financial institutions included in this exercise represented two-thirds of aggregate U.S bank holding company assets and more than one-half of loans U.S. banking system.


Each financial institution was asked to estimate two figures over a two-year time horizon starting in 2009 and ending in 2010. These figures were: a) potential losses from loan, securities and investment portfolios, including off‐balance sheet commitments and contingent liabilities and exposures; and b) the resources available to absorb these potential losses, including pre‐provision net revenue (PPNR) and allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL).

These estimates were arrived at under the assumption that one of two macroeconomic scenarios would play itself out over the next two years. These scenarios were: a) the baseline scenario, which reflected the consensus expectation of professional forecasters in February 2009 on the depth and duration of the recession; and b) the more adverse scenario, which was designed to reflect an recession that is longer and more severe than the consensus expection.

Error creating thumbnail Error creating thumbnail Error creating thumbnail

Baseline Scenario

As mentioned earlier, the baseline scenario was intended to represent a consensus view about the depth and duration of the recession. As such, the baseline assumptions for GDP growth and the unemployment rate in 2009 and 2010 were estimated to be equal to the average of forecasts published in February 2009 by Consensus Forecasts, the Blue Chip survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. In addition, the baseline assumptions for house prices were estimated to be consistent with the path implied by futures prices for the Case‐Shiller 10‐City Composite Index in February 2009 and the average response to a special question on house prices in the Blue Chip survey.

More Adverse Scenario

The more adverse scenario was intended to reflect the possibility that the economy could turn out to be appreciably weaker than expected under the baseline outlook. As such, the more adverse assumptions for GDP growth and the unemployment rate in 2009 and 2010 reflect a deeper and longer recession than the baseline assumptions, and were constructed from the historical track record of private forecasters as well as their current assessments of uncertainty.[3] In addition, the more adverse assumptions for house prirces were estimated to be about 10% lower at the end of 2010 relative to their level in the baseline scenario.[4] Note that the more adverse scenario is not intended to be a worst case scenario, but to reflect conditions that are severe yet plausible.

Baseline and More Adverse Scenarios
Real GDP (percent change in annual average)
Average Baseline-2.02.1
     Consensus Forecasts-2.12.0
     Blue Chip-1.92.1
     Survey of Professional Forecasters-2.02.2
Alternative More Adverse-3.30.5
Civilian Unemployment Rate (annual average)
Average Baseline8.48.8
     Consensus Forecasts8.49.0
     Blue Chip8.38.7
     Survey of Professional Forecasters8.48.8
Alternative More Adverse8.910.3
House Prices (percent change in Case‐Shiller 10‐City Composite Index)
Alternative More Adverse-22-7


The bank stress test results were released on 7 May 2009. They indicated that, if the economy were to track the more adverse scenario, losses in 2009 and 2010 at the 19 financial institutions assessed could be $600 billion. Of this amount, approximately $455 billion would be losses from accrual loan portfolios, particularly from residential mortgages and other consumer-related loans, while the remaining $135 billion would be losses from trading-related exposures and securities held in investment portfolios, specifically from charge-offs and write‐downs on the values of securities.

Besides estimating potential losses at these firms in 2009 and 2010, the stress tests also assessed potential resources available to absorb these losses. At the end of 2008, capital ratios at all 19 bank holding companies exceeded minimum regulatory requirements and Tier 1 capital at these firms totaled $835 billion. Nonetheless, 10 of the 19 assessed banks were ordered to raise $75 billion in additional capital buffers, most of which would need to be Tier 1 common capital. Regulators had originally required that the banks raise $185 billion in additional capital buffers, but noted that asset sales and capital restructuring had reduced this amount by $110 billion.

Aggregate Results for 19 Participating Bank Holding Companies for the More Adverse Scenario
At 31 December 2008in $ billions
Tier 1 Capital836.7
Tier 1 Common Capital412.5
Risk-Weighted Assets7,814.8
Estimated for 2009 and 2010 for the More Adverse Scenarioin $ billionsas % of loans
Total Estimated Losses (before Purchase Accounting Adjustments)599.2
     First Lien Mortgages102.38.8%
     Second/Junior Lien Mortgages83.213.8%
     Commercial and Industrial Loans60.16.1%
     Commercial Real Estate Loans53.08.5%
     Credit Card Loans82.422.5%
     Securities (AFS and HTM)35.2-na-
     Trading & Counterparty99.3-na-
     Memo: Purchase Accounting Adjustments64.3
Resources Other Than Capital to Absorb Losses in the More Adverse Scenario362.9
SCAP Buffer Added for More Adverse Scenario
Indicated SCAP Buffer as of 31 December 2008185.0
     Less: Capital Actions and Effects of Q1 2009 Results110.4
SCAP Buffer74.6

Loan Loss Rates

Error creating thumbnail

In the more adverse scenario, the estimated two-year cumulative loss rate on total loans equaled 9.1%, especially high by historical standards. As shown in the chart, this loss rate was higher than the two-year loss rates observed for U.S. commercial banks from 1920 to 2008.

Losses from Securities (AFS and HTM)

To evaluate losses for securities in available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM) portfolios, regulators focused on securities subject to credit risk. At the end of 2008, the 19 assessed banks held $1.5 trillion worth of securities. More than one‐half of these securities were Treasury, agencies or sovereign securities, or high-grade municipal debt, and so subject to limited or no credit risk. About $200 billion was in non‐agency mortgage‐backed securities (MBS). For securitized assets, regulators assessed if the security would become impaired during its lifetime and, if so, the security was written down to fair value with a corresponding other than temporary impairment (OTTI) charge equal to the difference between book and market value. These OTTI charges equaled $35 billion in the more adverse scenario, with almost one‐half of the estimated losses coming from the non‐agency mortgage-backed securities.

Trading‐Related Market and Counterparty Losses

Firms with trading assets of $100 billion or more were asked to estimate potential trading‐related market and counterparty credit losses under a market stress scenario based on the severe market shocks that occurred in the second half of 2008. The estimated losses from trading‐related exposures were substantial, close to $100 billion across the five firms to which it was applied. The primary drivers of potential stress losses were private equity holdings, other credit‐sensitive trading positions and possible losses stemming from counterparty credit exposures to over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives trading counterparties.


On 3 May 2009, renowned investor Warren Buffet criticized the stress tests being conducted on the 19 largest U.S. banks on the grounds that "a one-size-fits-all attempt to identify capital shortfalls was inappropriate".[5] He argued that stress tests were not necessary for 15 of the 19 banks being evaluated because they were not too big to fail and did not pose that kind of risk. He also added that all but 4 of the banks being tested could easily be sold with the assistance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

See Also


  1. Banks won concessions on tests, The Wall Street Journal
  2. U.S. looks to tangible common equity in stress tests, Reuters
  3. Based on the historical accuracy of Blue Chip forecasts made since the late 1970s, the likelihood that the average unemployment rate in 2010 could be at least as high as in the alternative more adverse scenario is roughly 10%. In addition, the subjective probability assessments provided by participants in the January Consensus Forecasts survey and the February Survey of Professional Forecasters imply a roughly 15% chance that real GDP growth could be at least as low, and unemployment at least as high, as assumed in the more adverse scenario.
  4. Based on the year‐to‐year variability in house prices since 1900, and controlling for macroeconomic factors, there is roughly a 10% probability that house prices will be 10% lower than in the baseline by 2010.
  5. Buffett hits out at stress tests, Financial Times
Wikinvest © 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. Use of this site is subject to express Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, and Disclaimer. By continuing past this page, you agree to abide by these terms. Any information provided by Wikinvest, including but not limited to company data, competitors, business analysis, market share, sales revenues and other operating metrics, earnings call analysis, conference call transcripts, industry information, or price targets should not be construed as research, trading tips or recommendations, or investment advice and is provided with no warrants as to its accuracy. Stock market data, including US and International equity symbols, stock quotes, share prices, earnings ratios, and other fundamental data is provided by data partners. Stock market quotes delayed at least 15 minutes for NASDAQ, 20 mins for NYSE and AMEX. Market data by Xignite. See data providers for more details. Company names, products, services and branding cited herein may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The use of trademarks or service marks of another is not a representation that the other is affiliated with, sponsors, is sponsored by, endorses, or is endorsed by Wikinvest.
Powered by MediaWiki