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Big Three Auto Woes |
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| ==Who loses?== | ==Who loses?== | ||
| - | *[[American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings (AXL)]], [[Dana Corporation (DCNAQ)]], [[Lear (LEA)]], [[ArvinMeritor (ARM)]], [[TRW Automotive Holdings (TRW)]], and [[BorgWarner (BWA)]] are all auto driveline/other components suppliers who derive about 40% or more of their profits from North American sales, and most of these North American sales from the Big 3. Although many of these suppliers are trying to branch out into European/Asian markets, pricing pressures mean that it won't be easy to immediately replace lost volume from the Big 3. | + | *[[American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings (AXL)]], [[Dana Corporation (DCNAQ)]], [[Lear (LEA)]], [[ArvinMeritor (ARM)]], [[TRW Automotive Holdings (TRW)]], [[Cummins (CMI)]], and [[BorgWarner (BWA)]] are all auto driveline/other components suppliers who derive about 40% or more of their profits from North American sales, and most of these North American sales from the Big 3. Although many of these suppliers are trying to branch out into European/Asian markets, pricing pressures mean that it won't be easy to immediately replace lost volume from the Big 3. |
| *[[General Motors (GM)]] spinoff auto parts makers [[Delphi Corporation (DPHIQ)]] and [[Visteon (VC)]] still rely heavily on a Big-3-market, especially on Ford. | *[[General Motors (GM)]] spinoff auto parts makers [[Delphi Corporation (DPHIQ)]] and [[Visteon (VC)]] still rely heavily on a Big-3-market, especially on Ford. | ||
| *[[Magna International (MGA)]] and [[Johnson Controls (JCI)]] both depend on the Big 3 for a large portion (almost 40-50%) of auto interior component sales. | *[[Magna International (MGA)]] and [[Johnson Controls (JCI)]] both depend on the Big 3 for a large portion (almost 40-50%) of auto interior component sales. | ||
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This article describes a concept which could impact a variety of companies, countries or industries. To see what companies and articles reference this concept page, click here. |
In recent years, the recurring troubles of the American Big 3 automakers have been coming to a head. General Motors (GM), Ford, and Daimler Chrysler AG face a host of problems. Legacy costs inherited from past manufacturing heydays in the form of costly pension and health care plans for retired employees add up to hundreds of billions of dollars. Unappealing gas-guzzler product lines that are a step behind current auto buying trends aren't driving strong earnings, either; instead, the Big 3 are trying to pad flagging normal sales rates with price incentives. Finally, continuing tussles with the United Auto Workers make it hard to cut costs and downsize to profitability. Meanwhile, Asian and European competitors are rapidly outstripping these traditional auto manufacturing powerhouses.
Asian and European brands captured 54.2% of overall vehicle sales in June, edging out the 45.8% of sales that went to the U.S. brands, according to Autodata (see chart above), placing the Big Three in their weakest competitive position ever compared to their overseas rival. Until last year, there had never been a month that American car buyers preferred the combined offerings of Asian and European automakers to those of the Big Three.
The Big 3 auto woes strike North American auto components manufacturers particularly hard, and hit in more than one way. Reductions in production volume and capacity will obviously decrease sales for the parts suppliers, but spending cuts within the Big 3 infrastructure also translate into decreased earnings for suppliers.
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