CVS » Topics » ITEM 3: STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING SPECIAL STOCKHOLDER MEETINGS

This excerpt taken from the CVS DEF 14A filed Mar 24, 2009.

ITEM  3:  STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING SPECIAL STOCKHOLDER MEETINGS

 

On or about October 28, 2008 (later modified), the Company received the following proposal from Mr. William Steiner, 112 Abbottsford Gate, Piermont, New York 10968, beneficial owner of 10,500 shares of the Company’s stock. In accordance with SEC rules, we are reprinting the proposal and supporting statement as modified by the proponent on November 24, 2008 (the “William Steiner Proposal”) in this proxy statement as they were submitted to us:

3 – Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call a special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Statement of William Steiner

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. Governance ratings services, including The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, took special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

This proposal topic also won impressive support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

 

Occidental Petroleum (OXY)   66%   Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)   67%   Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)   69%   Nick Rossi

The merits of this Special Shareowner Meetings proposal should also be considered in the context of the need for further improvements in our company’s corporate governance and in individual director performance. In 2008 the following governance and performance issues were identified:

  n The Corporate Library (TCL) www.thecorporatelibrary.com, an independent investment research firm, rated our company:
       “Very High Concern” in executive pay – $26 million for Thomas Ryan ($392,000 for defined contribution plans).
       “D” in Corporate Governance.
       “High Governance Risk Assessment”
  n Three directors were designated as “Problem Directors” by The Corporate Library due to their involvement with FleetBoston, which approved a major round of executive rewards even as the company was under investigation by regulators for multiple instances of improper activity:
Thomas Ryan    Our CEO
Terrence Murray    Our Lead Director and executive pay committee member
Marion Heard    Audit and nomination committee member

 

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  n Plus our directors served on these boards rated “D” by TCL
1) Thomas Ryan    Yum! Brands (YUM)
2) David Dorman    Yum! Brands (YUM)
3) Richard Swift    Ingersoll-Rand (IR)
4) Jean-Pierre Millon    Cypress Bioscience (CYPB)
5) Lance Piccolo    Chemtura Corp. (CEM)
6) Marian Heard    Sovereign Bancorp (SOV)
  n Two directors had non-director links with our company – Independence concern:
       Lance Piccolo
       Kirsten Gibney Williams
  n Two of our directors held 4 or 5 directorships – Over-commitment concern:
       Richard Swift
       Sheli Rosenberg
  n We had no shareholder right to:
       Act by written consent.
       Call a special meeting.
       Cumulative voting.
       An Independent Chairman

The above concerns shows there is need for improvement. Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

Special Shareowner Meetings –

Yes on 3

Statement of The Board Recommending a Vote AGAINST the William Steiner Proposal

CVS Caremark is strongly committed to good governance practices and is keenly interested in the views and concerns of our stockholders. The William Steiner Proposal would provide stockholders holding 10% of outstanding common shares with an unfettered right to call a special meeting. In that regard, we would observe that calling a special meeting of stockholders is not a matter to be taken lightly. We believe that a special meeting should only be held to cover extraordinary events when fiduciary, strategic, significant transactional or similar considerations dictate that the matter be addressed on an expeditious basis, rather than waiting until the next annual meeting. Organizing and preparing for a special meeting involves significant management commitment of time and focus, and imposes substantial legal, administrative and distribution costs.

The proposal, if implemented, would permit stockholders holding 10% of outstanding common stock, regardless of the holding period of this ownership stake, to call a special meeting at any time and with any frequency, and potentially covering agenda items relevant to particular constituencies as opposed to stockholders generally. We believe that adopting such a standard for calling special meetings would present a real risk of significant cost, management distraction and diversion of management and financial resources to address a possibly unlimited number of special meetings. We therefore believe that such a standard would not be in the best interest of stockholders.

Furthermore, the Board does not believe that there is merit to the proponent’s contention that the ability of stockholders to call a special meeting of stockholders is necessary to prevent the Board from becoming insulated from investors. We provide significant opportunity for our stockholders to raise matters at our Annual Meetings. Stockholders have frequently used our Annual Meetings to propose business by making proposals through the proxy rules, such as this one, or to communicate their concerns by raising issues from the floor of the meeting. Our Board believes that we currently maintain open lines of communications with our stockholders and are committed to adopting and following best practices in corporate governance.

Accordingly, the Board recommends a vote AGAINST the William Steiner Proposal.

 

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