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This excerpt taken from the CHK DEF 14A filed Apr 30, 2009. Shareholders Supporting Statement Employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity diminishes employee morale and productivity. Because state and local laws are inconsistent with respect to employment discrimination, our company would benefit from a consistent, corporate wide policy to enhance efforts to prevent discrimination, resolve complaints internally, and ensure a respectful and supportive atmosphere for all employees. Chesapeake Energy Corporation will enhance its competitive edge by joining the growing ranks of companies guaranteeing equal opportunity for all employees. This excerpt taken from the CHK DEF 14A filed Apr 29, 2008. Shareholders Supporting Statement The proponent believes the election of directors is the strongest way that shareholders influence the directors of any corporation. Currently, our board of directors is divided into three classes with each class serving three-year terms. Because of this structure, shareholders may only vote for one-third of the directors each year. This is not in the best interest of shareholders because it reduces accountability. U.S. Bancorp, Associated Banc-Corp, Piper-Jaffray Companies, Fifth-Third Bancorp, Pan Pacific Retail Properties, Qwest Communications International, Xcel Energy, Greater Bay Bancorp, North Valley Bancorp, Pacific Continental Corporation, Regions Financial Corporation, CoBiz Financial Inc., Marshall & Illsley Corporation, and Wintrust Financial, Inc. are among the corporations electing directors annually because of the efforts of the proponent. The performance of our management and our Board of Directors is now being more strongly tested due to economic conditions and the accountability for performance must be given to the shareholders whose capital has been entrusted in the form of share investments. A study by researchers at Harvard Business School and the University of Pennsylvanias Wharton School titled Corporate Governance and Equity Prices [Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 2003], looked at the relationship between corporate governance practices (including classified boards) and firm performance. The study found a significant positive link between governance practices favoring shareholders (such as annual directors election) and firm value. While management may argue that directors need and deserve continuity, management should become aware that continuity and tenure may be best assured when their performance as directors is exemplary and is deemed beneficial to the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. The proponent regards as unfounded the concern expressed by some that annual election of all directors could leave companies without experienced directors in the event that all incumbents are voted out by shareholders. In the unlikely event that shareholders do vote to replace all directors, such a decision would express dissatisfaction with the incumbent directors and reflect a need for change. If you agree that shareholders may benefit from greater accountability afforded by annual election of all directors, please vote FOR this proposal. | EXCERPTS ON THIS PAGE:
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