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C » Topics » Stockholders hereby request that the Citigroup Board of Directors adopt promptly a resolution requiring that the Chairman of the Board serve in that capacity only and have no management duties, titles, or responsibilities.This excerpt taken from the C DEF 14A filed Mar 14, 2006. Stockholders hereby request that the Citigroup Board of Directors adopt promptly a resolution requiring that the Chairman of the Board serve in that capacity only, and have no management duties, titles, or responsibilities.
When an individual acts, for example, as both a corporations Chairman and its CEO, a vital separation of power and responsibility is eliminated and the owners of the corporation, its stockholders, are deprived of a crucial protection against conflicts of interest as well as a clear and direct channel of communication with the corporation.
What stockholder-damaging conflicts of interest can be more serious than those that so often occur when overseers are allowed to oversee and supervise themselves? When a corporations Chairman is also its CEO, such conflicts can and do occur.
At Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other legends of mismanagement and corruption, the Chairmen also served as CEOs. Their dual roles helped those individuals to achieve virtually total control of the companies.
When a Chairman also runs a company, the information received by directors and others may or may not be accurate. If a CEO wants to cover up corporate improprieties, how difficult is it to convince subordinates to go along? If they disagree, to whom do they complain? The Chairman?
As banker, investment banker, and concerned and outspoken stockholder, my experience with corporate chairmen, presidents, CEOs, and directors has been very considerable. And I do not come lately to Corporate Governance. The term was new when, in 1979, I originated and sponsored the first Corporate Governance proposal ever voted upon at 3M Company, calling upon it to select a board composed of a majority of non-management Outside Directors.
Few individual stockholders know enough about companies to question their activities. Few institutional investors, many of whom know little if any more, have the guts to question companies and thereby risk loss of access to the widely profitable Inside Information Superhighway. That combination of stockholders has proven a recipe for disasters.
Stockholders must continue to expect the unexpected unless and until they demand that boards be composed of substantial majorities of independent and objective outside directors who are particularly well-qualified to serve their interests and until directors select as Chairmen those who are independent of managements.
Individual stockholders are responsible only to themselves, but institutional stockholders are responsible to millions of investors. All too often they have betrayed not only their moral obligations, but their duties as fiduciaries.
Efforts to improve Corporate Governance are found increasingly in stockholder proposals such as this proposals wide opposed by institutional stockholders. Its time for those whose financial futures are in the hands of money managers to inform those fiduciaries that they expect them to recognize their duties and to fulfil their legal obligations. There is no higher priority. Voting in favor of this proposal will help.
This excerpt taken from the C DEF 14A filed Mar 15, 2005. Stockholders hereby request that the Citigroup Board of Directors adopt promptly a resolution requiring that the Chairman of the Board serve in that capacity only and have no management duties, titles, or responsibilities.
When a person acts, for example, both as a corporations Chairman and its CEO, a vital separation of power and responsibility is eliminated and the owners of the corporation, its stockholders, are deprived not only of a crucial
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Table of Contentsprotection against conflicts of interest, they are deprived of a clear and direct channel of communication with the corporation.
What stockholder-damaging conflicts of interest can be more serious than those that so often occur when overseers are allowed to oversee and supervise themselves? When a corporations Chairman is also its CEO, such conflicts can and do happen.
It is well to remember that at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other legends of mismanagement and/or corruption, the Chairmen also served as CEOs. And their dual roles helped those individuals to achive virtually total control of the companies.
Clearly, when a Chairman runs a company, the information received by directors and others may or may not be accurate. If a CEO wants to cover up corporate improprieties, how difficult is it to convince subordinates to go along? If they disagree, with whom do they lodge a complaint? The Chairman?
As Citibanker, investment banker, and a concerned and outspoken investor, my experience with corporate Chairmen, Presidents, CEOs, CFOs, counsels, and directors has been very considerable. And I do not come lately to Corporate Governance. The term was new in 1979 when I originated and sponsored the first such proposal ever voted upon at 3M Company, calling upon it to reconstitute its board so that a majority of directors would be non-management Outside Directors.
Few individual stockholders know enough about companies to question their activities, and institutional investors, many of whom know just as little, are too busy currying favor with managements to have the guts to question them and thereby risk loss of access to the very profitable Inside Information Superhighway. That combination of stockholders has proven a recipe for disaster.
Stockholders must continue to expect the unexpected unless and until they help cause company boards to be composed of substantial majorities of independent and objective outside directors who are particularly well-qualified to serve their interests and until those directors select as chairmen those who are similarly independent of managements.
While individual stockholders are responsible only to themselves, institutional stockholders are responsible to millions of investors. All too often they have betrayed not only their moral obligations, but their duties as fiduciaries.
Efforts to improve Corporate Governance increasingly have been embodied in stockholder proposals such as this which have been opposed almost universally by institutional stockholders. It is time for those whose financial futures are in the hands of money managers to inform them that they expect them to recognize their duties and to fulfil their legal obligations there is no other priority. Voting in favor of this proposal will help.
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