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DRAD » Topics » Anti-takeover provisions in our organizational documents and Delaware law may discourage or prevent a change in control, even if an acquisition would be beneficial to our stockholders, which could affect our stock price adversely and prevent attempts by oThis excerpt taken from the DRAD 10-Q filed Nov 4, 2005. Anti-takeover
provisions in our organizational documents and Delaware law may discourage or
prevent a change in control, even if an acquisition would be beneficial to our
stockholders, which could affect our stock price adversely and prevent attempts
by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management.
Our restated certificate of incorporation and restated bylaws contain provisions that may delay or prevent a change in control, discourage bids at a premium over the market price of our common stock and adversely affect the market price of our common stock and the voting and other rights of the holders of our common stock. These provisions include:
prohibiting our stockholders from calling a special meeting of stockholders unless they hold not less than 20% of the total number of votes to be cast at such a meeting; permitting the issuance of additional shares of our common stock or preferred stock without stockholder approval; prohibiting our stockholders from making certain changes to our restated certificate of incorporation or restated bylaws except with 66-2/3% stockholder approval; and requiring advance notice for raising matters of business or making nominations at stockholders meetings.
We are also subject to provisions of the Delaware corporation law that, in general, prohibit any business combination with a beneficial owner of 15% or more of our common stock for five years unless the holders acquisition of our stock was approved in advance by our board of directors. Although we believe these provisions collectively provide for an opportunity to receive higher bids by requiring potential acquirors to negotiate with our board of directors, they would apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of our board of directors, which is responsible for appointing the members of our management.
This excerpt taken from the DRAD 10-Q filed Jul 28, 2005. Anti-takeover provisions in our organizational documents and
Delaware law may discourage or prevent a change in control, even if an
acquisition would be beneficial to our stockholders, which could affect our
stock price adversely and prevent attempts by our stockholders to replace or
remove our current management.
Our restated certificate of incorporation and restated bylaws contain provisions that may delay or prevent a change in control, discourage bids at a premium over the market price of our common stock and adversely affect the market price of our common stock and the voting and other rights of the holders of our common stock. These provisions include:
prohibiting our stockholders from calling a special meeting of stockholders unless they hold not less than 20% of the total number of votes to be cast at such a meeting;
permitting the issuance of additional shares of our common stock or preferred stock without stockholder approval;
prohibiting our stockholders from making certain changes to our restated certificate of incorporation or restated bylaws except with 66-2/3% stockholder approval; and
requiring advance notice for raising matters of business or making nominations at stockholders meetings.
We are also subject to provisions of the Delaware corporation law that, in general, prohibit any business combination with a beneficial owner of 15% or more of our common stock for five years unless the holders acquisition of our stock was approved in advance by our board of directors. Although we believe these provisions collectively provide for an opportunity to receive higher bids by requiring potential acquirors to negotiate with our board of directors, they would apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of our board of directors, which is responsible for appointing the members of our management.
This excerpt taken from the DRAD 10-Q filed May 9, 2005. Anti-takeover
provisions in our organizational documents and Delaware law may discourage or
prevent a change in control, even if an acquisition would be beneficial to our
stockholders, which could affect our stock price adversely and prevent attempts
by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management.
Our restated certificate of incorporation and restated bylaws contain provisions that may delay or prevent a change in control, discourage bids at a premium over the market price of our common stock and adversely affect the market price of our common stock and the voting and other rights of the holders of our common stock. These provisions include:
prohibiting our stockholders from calling a special meeting of stockholders unless they hold not less than 20% of the total number of votes to be cast at such a meeting;
permitting the issuance of additional shares of our common stock or preferred stock without stockholder approval;
prohibiting our stockholders from making certain changes to our restated certificate of incorporation or restated bylaws except with 662/3% stockholder approval; and
requiring advance notice for raising matters of business or making nominations at stockholders meetings.
We are also subject to provisions of the Delaware corporation law that, in general, prohibit any business combination with a beneficial owner of 15% or more of our common stock for five years unless the holders acquisition of our stock was approved in advance by our board of directors. Although we believe these provisions collectively provide for an opportunity to receive higher bids by requiring potential acquirors to negotiate with our board of directors, they would apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of our board of directors, which is responsible for appointing the members of our management.
This excerpt taken from the DRAD 10-K filed Mar 3, 2005. Anti-takeover provisions in our organizational documents and Delaware law
may discourage or prevent a change in control, even if an acquisition would be
beneficial to our stockholders, which could affect our stock price adversely
and prevent attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current
management.
Our restated certificate of incorporation and restated bylaws contain provisions that may delay or prevent a change in control, discourage bids at a premium over the market price of our common stock and adversely affect the market price of our common stock and the voting and other rights of the holders of our common stock. These provisions include:
prohibiting our stockholders from calling a special meeting of stockholders unless they hold not less than 20% of the total number of votes to be cast at such a meeting;
permitting the issuance of additional shares of our common stock or preferred stock without stockholder approval;
prohibiting our stockholders from making certain changes to our restated certificate of incorporation or restated bylaws except with 662/3% stockholder approval; and
requiring advance notice for raising matters of business or making nominations at stockholders meetings.
We are also subject to provisions of the Delaware corporation law that, in general, prohibit any business combination with a beneficial owner of 15% or more of our common stock for five years unless the holders acquisition of our stock was approved in advance by our board of directors. Although we believe these provisions collectively provide for an opportunity to receive higher bids by requiring potential acquirors to negotiate with our board of directors, they would apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove our current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of our board of directors, which is responsible for appointing the members of our management.
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