This excerpt taken from the HPQ DEF 14A filed Jan 23, 2007.
We believe that stockholders of U.S. public companies currently have no meaningful control over the process by which directors are nominated and elected. Stockholders whose suggested nominees are rejected by a nominating committee have no recourse other than sponsoring a dissident election campaign, which is so expensive that it rarely occurs outside the takeover context. Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk has estimated only about 80 contested elections occurred at U.S. public companies from 1996 through 2002 that did not seek to change control of the corporation.
In our view, access to the proxy for purposes of electing a director nominated by stockholders with a significant stake in HP is the most effective mechanism for ensuring accountability. We believe that greater accountability would benefit HP and enhance shareholder value.
We urge stockholders to vote for this proposal.