ICI » Topics » 2005 Remuneration structure

This excerpt taken from the ICI 6-K filed Mar 21, 2007.
2007 Remuneration structure
The relative values of the main elements of the remuneration packages for the Chief Executive and the other Executive Directors, following the policy changes set out above, are illustrated in the charts below. The performance related elements, when valued at target performance levels, comprise more than 60% of the package (excluding pension and other benefits).


 

www.ici.com ICI Annual Report and Accounts 2006 45

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   Board of Directors, governance and remuneration
 

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This excerpt taken from the ICI 6-K filed Mar 14, 2006.
2006 Remuneration structure
The relative values of the main elements of the Executive Directors’ remuneration packages are illustrated, for UK Executive Directors, in the chart below. The performance related elements, when valued at target performance levels, comprise more than 50% of the package (excluding pension and other benefits).

Base salaries
Salaries for Executive Directors have been reviewed for 2006 in line with the policy set out on this page. The average increase for those due a review on 1 January 2006 was 4.4% . The maximum increase was 9.7% and the minimum was nil. In line with the policy on setting base salaries within market ranges, a nil increase was applied to any executive whose base salary was positioned above their market range. The nil increase is a reflection of the application of the base salary policy and not the Executive’s performance.


   
42 ICI Annual Report and Accounts 2005 Remuneration report

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Annual Incentive Plan
The target bonus opportunity available to Executive Directors for 2006 will remain at 50% of salary. A maximum opportunity of 100% of salary will be possible for significant over-achievement of the pre-set targets. The 2006 bonus targets for Executive Directors are a mix of profit, cash flow, sales, return on capital employed and performance against key strategic objectives. These measures and the associated targets are consistent with achievement of at least the four-year strategic financial goals communicated to shareholders during 2003. Financial targets, related performance ranges and key strategic objectives are approved by the Remuneration Committee, which retains discretion in the final determination of awards by taking into account the Group’s broader performance, in addition to the achievement of the specified financial targets.

Performance Growth Plan (PGP)
The PGP makes conditional awards of ICI shares to Executive Directors which are linked to performance over a fixed three-year period, measured as follows:

for the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer, the number of shares earned under the PGP will depend wholly on the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) for ICI relative to the TSR of each of the companies in ICI’s Peer Group as set out below. TSR is the change in share price plus reinvested dividends;
 
for the other Executive Directors, each of whom has responsibility for the performance of one of ICI’s International Businesses, reward will be based on the performance of both ICI and their Business:
 
  50% of their award will be based on the TSR performance of the Company relative to the Peer Group; and
 
  the other 50% of their award will depend on the Economic Profit performance over three years of the Business for which the Executive Director is responsible. Economic Profit is based on profit after tax less a charge for the use of capital; and
 
in addition, the Remuneration Committee must be satisfied that the underlying profit performance of ICI is sufficient to justify the receipt of shares under the PGP, notwithstanding the relative TSR achieved.

The Peer Group for the TSR element represents key competitors of ICI’s International Businesses and companies comparable to ICI, selected on the basis of market location, size, portfolio and performance. The Peer Group is approved by the Remuneration Committee with advice from external independent advisers. It is reviewed annually and also on the occasion of a significant event impacting either ICI or one of the Peer Group companies. The Peer Group companies for the conditional awards to be made in 2006 are: Air Products and Chemicals, Akzo Nobel, BASF, Chemtura (formerly Crompton Corporation), Ciba Speciality Chemicals, Clariant, Degussa, Dow Chemical, DSM, DuPont, Givaudan, International Flavors & Fragrances, Rohm and Haas, PPG Industries, The BOC Group and Sherwin-Williams. This Peer Group remains unchanged from 2005.

The Remuneration Committee considers that there are a sufficient number of comparators to ensure that the basis for performance measurement is stable and robust.

The maximum conditional award to be made in 2006 will be 100% of base salary (200% in the case of US Directors). For the maximum awards to be paid on the TSR element, performance must be at position 3 or higher out of the 17 companies (including ICI) in the Peer Group. For achieving median TSR performance (position 9 out of 17), 40% of this maximum award will be paid. Awards are pro-rated between positions 9 and 3. No award will be paid for below median TSR performance (below position 9 out of 17).

TSR has been selected as a performance measure as it will reward any relative out-performance of ICI versus its global competitors. TSR is calculated by independent external advisers and approved by the Remuneration Committee.

Economic Profit has been selected as it is a measure of profitable growth and efficient use of capital that are significant contributors to the generation of sustainable shareholder value. The Economic Profit targets for each International Business, which are set by the Remuneration Committee, are designed to be as demanding as the TSR measure.

The shares required to make awards under the PGP are provided via a trust funded by ICI. There is, therefore, no dilution of the Company’s issued share capital as the shares are purchased in the market.

The operation of the PGP is in accordance with the terms of the Plan approved by shareholders at the AGM held on 28 April 2000.

Executive Share Option Plan (the Plan)
The Plan grants options that vest and become exercisable provided demanding performance conditions are met. For grants made under the Plan in 2004 and 2005 Earnings per Share (EPS) was used as a performance condition. For the awards to be made in 2006 the Remuneration Committee is committed to continuing to set demanding performance targets. However, setting appropriate EPS targets under the new International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is significantly more complex than in previous years. This is due to the potentially greater volatility of EPS under IFRS that will be generated by the treatment of pensions related charges and other items and by the potential impact of continuing cost reduction activities.

In light of the above, the Remuneration Committee has concluded that it would be premature to set a performance condition until a greater understanding of the implications of IFRS has been fully reviewed. A range of alternatives is being examined which may result in continuing with EPS as a performance metric or in moving to a different performance condition. In either case, the condition used will be no less challenging, in the view of the Remuneration Committee, than that used for previous grants under the Plan. The targets will be announced prior to the 2006 AGM and disclosed in next year’s Remuneration Report. There will continue to be no retesting of the performance condition.

The maximum vesting of options, as a multiple of salary at grant, will continue to be three times salary (4.5 times salary for US based Executives). Options under the Plan must be held for a minimum of three years from date of grant before they can be exercised and lapse if not exercised within ten years. The shares to meet options exercised will be bought in the market or provided by a new issue of shares.

It is intended to make option grants to Executive Directors at the levels set out above, after the Remuneration Committee has finalised the performance condition to be applied.

This excerpt taken from the ICI 20-F filed Apr 1, 2005.

2005 Remuneration structure

Performance Growth Plan (PGP)
The PGP makes conditional awards of ICI shares to Executive Directors which are linked to performance over a fixed three-year period, measured as follows:

for the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer, the number of shares earned under the PGP will depend wholly on the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) for ICI relative to the TSR of each of the companies in ICIs Peer Group as set out below. TSR is the change in share price plus reinvested dividends;
     
for the other Executive Directors, each of whom has responsibility for the performance of one of ICIs International Businesses, reward will also be based on the performance of their Business:
     
  50% of their award will be based on the TSR performance of the Company relative to the Peer Group;
     
  the other 50% of their award will depend on the Economic Profit performance over three years of the Business for which the Executive Director is responsible. Economic Profit is based on profit after tax less a charge for the use of capital.
in addition, the Remuneration Committee must be satisfied that the underlying profit performance of ICI is sufficient to justify the receipt of shares under the PGP, notwithstanding the relative TSR achieved.

The Peer Group for the TSR element represents key competitors of ICIs International Businesses and companies comparable to ICI, selected on the basis of market location, size, portfolio and performance. The Peer Group is approved by the Remuneration Committee with advice from external independent advisers. It is reviewed annually and also on the occasion of a significant event impacting either ICI or one of the Peer Group companies. The companies for the conditional awards to be made in 2005 are: Air Products and Chemicals, Akzo Nobel, BASF, Ciba Speciality Chemicals, Clariant, Crompton Corporation, Degussa, Dow Chemical, DSM, Du Pont, Givaudan, International Flavors & Fragrances, Rohm and Haas Company, PPG Industries, The BOC Group and The Sherwin-Williams Company.

TSR has been selected as a performance measure as it will reward any relative out-performance of ICI versus its global competitors. TSR is calculated by independent external advisers and approved by the Remuneration Committee.

Economic Profit has been selected as it is a critical measure of profitable growth and efficient use of capital that are significant contributors to the generation of sustainable shareholder value. The Economic Profit targets for each International Business, which are set by the Remuneration Committee, are designed to be as demanding as the TSR measure.

The shares required to make awards under the PGP are provided via a trust funded by ICI. There is no dilution of the Companys issued share capital as the shares are purchased in the market.

 


 

ICI ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2004


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REMUNERATION REPORT   45

 

This excerpt taken from the ICI 6-K filed Mar 16, 2005.

2005 Remuneration structure

The relative values of the main elements of the Executive Directorsremuneration packages are illustrated in the chart below. The performance related elements, when valued at target performance levels, comprise more than 50% of the package (excluding pension and other benefits).

Base salaries
Salaries for Executive Directors have been reviewed for 2005 in line with the policy set out on page 43. Individual increases range from 3.6% to 9.4%, with an average increase of 5.6%.

Annual Incentive Plan
The target bonus opportunity available to Executive Directors for 2005 will be 50% of salary. A maximum opportunity of 100% of salary will be possible for significant over-achievement of the pre-set targets. Bonus targets for Executive Directors will be a mix of delivery of profit, cash flow, sales, return on capital employed and the achievement of key strategic objectives. These measures and the associated targets are consistent with achievement of at least the four-year strategic financial goals communicated to shareholders during 2003. Financial targets, related performance ranges and key strategic objectives are approved by the Remuneration Committee, which retains discretion in the final determination of awards by taking into account the Groups broader performance in addition to the achievement of the specified financial targets.

Performance Growth Plan (PGP)
The PGP makes conditional awards of ICI shares to Executive Directors which are linked to performance over a fixed three-year period, measured as follows:

for the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer, the number of shares earned under the PGP will depend wholly on the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) for ICI relative to the TSR of each of the companies in ICIs Peer Group as set out below. TSR is the change in share price plus reinvested dividends;
     
for the other Executive Directors, each of whom has responsibility for the performance of one of ICIs International Businesses, reward will also be based on the performance of their Business:
     
  50% of their award will be based on the TSR performance of the Company relative to the Peer Group;
     
  the other 50% of their award will depend on the Economic Profit performance over three years of the Business for which the Executive Director is responsible. Economic Profit is based on profit after tax less a charge for the use of capital.
in addition, the Remuneration Committee must be satisfied that the underlying profit performance of ICI is sufficient to justify the receipt of shares under the PGP, notwithstanding the relative TSR achieved.

The Peer Group for the TSR element represents key competitors of ICIs International Businesses and companies comparable to ICI, selected on the basis of market location, size, portfolio and performance. The Peer Group is approved by the Remuneration Committee with advice from external independent advisers. It is reviewed annually and also on the occasion of a significant event impacting either ICI or one of the Peer Group companies. The companies for the conditional awards to be made in 2005 are: Air Products and Chemicals, Akzo Nobel, BASF, Ciba Speciality Chemicals, Clariant, Crompton Corporation, Degussa, Dow Chemical, DSM, Du Pont, Givaudan, International Flavors & Fragrances, Rohm and Haas Company, PPG Industries, The BOC Group and The Sherwin-Williams Company.

The maximum conditional award to be made in 2005 will be 100% of base salary (200% in the case of US Directors). For the maximum awards to be paid on the TSR element, performance must be at position three or higher out of the seventeen companies (including ICI) in the Peer Group. For achieving median TSR performance (position nine out of seventeen), 40% of this maximum award will be paid. Awards are pro-rated between positions nine and three. No award will be paid for below median TSR performance (below position nine out of seventeen).

TSR has been selected as a performance measure as it will reward any relative out-performance of ICI versus its global competitors. TSR is calculated by independent external advisers and approved by the Remuneration Committee.

Economic Profit has been selected as it is a critical measure of profitable growth and efficient use of capital that are significant contributors to the generation of sustainable shareholder value. The Economic Profit targets for each International Business, which are set by the Remuneration Committee, are designed to be as demanding as the TSR measure.

The shares required to make awards under the PGP are provided via a trust funded by ICI. There is no dilution of the Companys issued share capital as the shares are purchased in the market.

Executive Share Option Plan
Share Option grants are made under a plan approved by shareholders in 2004. The Plan grants options that vest and become exercisable provided demanding Earnings per Share (EPS) performance conditions are met. EPS has been selected because it is the quantifiable outcome of the key targets set by the Board in the areas of sales growth, trading profit margin and Return on Capital Employed. For the awards to be made in 2005, these targets and corresponding vesting levels will be defined relative to the achievement of specific EPS amounts in 2007.

   Earnings per Share   Options vesting as a   Options vesting as
      for 2007   multiple of salary at   a multiple of salary
    grant UK:   at grant USA:
Less than 27.1 p nil   nil
      27.1 p 1 times salary   1.5 times salary
      29.1 p 2 times salary   3 times salary
      31.1 p 3 times salary   4.5 times salary

The numbers of shares vesting will be pro-rated, on a straight-line basis, between points on the above scale. There will be no retesting of these conditions after the three-year performance period.


 

ICI ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2004


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REMUNERATION REPORT   45

 

The performance target for option vesting continues to be challenging and is in line with the commitment in the strategic update announced during 2003 to targets which, if achieved, should result in double digit compound annual growth rate for four years from a baseline EPS of 18.5p for 2003. The minimum performance threshold of 27.1p EPS in 2007 will require 23.7% growth from the EPS for 2004 of 21.9p (see page 121 note 5). This continues to be ahead of market practice for comparable companies and takes account of ongoing EPS benefits arising from ICIs restructuring programme announced in 2003. Such growth levels are therefore unlikely to be sustainable for subsequent grants, though the Remuneration Committee will continue to set targets that remain demanding.

     
  Earnings per share
For the purpose of calculations in connection with the Plan, EPS will be measured in accordance with the rules for calculating Diluted EPS as set out in UK FRS No.14, excluding any element relating to exceptional items and/or goodwill amortisation. The EPS figures that determine vesting, as laid out in the Performance Conditions in this Remuneration Report, are quoted under current accounting standards and will require restatement when International Financial Reporting Standards are adopted in full. The Remuneration Committee will ensure that the adjustments made are fair and equitable.
 
     

The Committee may reduce the awards that vest having regard to the underlying performance of ICI and the extent to which EPS performance reflects progress towards the financial targets contained in the 2003 strategic update.

Options under the Plan must be held for a minimum of three years from date of grant before they can be exercised and lapse if not exercised within ten years. The shares to meet options exercised will be either bought in the market or provided by a new issue of shares.

It is intended to make option grants to Executive Directors at the levels set out on page 44 and in accordance with these criteria in the 42 day period following the announcement of the 2004 full year results.

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