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This excerpt taken from the PCS 8-K filed Jun 9, 2009. Spectrum and Market Concentration Limits The FCC has certain policies intended to prevent undue concentration of the terrestrial wireless broadband mobile services market. For example, the FCC conducts a case-by-case review of all transactions where wireless spectrum is being assigned or a transfer of control is occurring where both parties to the transaction hold CMRS spectrum in the same or in an overlapping area. Previously, the FCC would screen a transaction for competitive concerns if, upon consummation, 95 MHz or more of cellular, broadband PCS, enhanced SMR, and 700 MHz spectrum in a single market was attributable to a party or affiliated group, or if there was a material change in the post-transaction market share concentrations as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. In 2008, the FCC revised this screen to include situations where AWS-1 or certain BRS spectrum is available, on a geographic area basis as follows:
The FCC also stated that it now will apply this revised screen to spectrum acquired via auction. These benchmarks are subject to pending reconsideration proceedings at the FCC. The FCC also is considering whether to initiate a proceeding to eliminate case-by-case application of a spectrum screen entirely in favor of a bright-line spectrum cap. We are well below the spectrum aggregation screen in the geographic areas in which we hold or have access to licenses which means we may be able to acquire additional spectrum either by auction or in private transactions and we may be able to be acquired by certain other carriers. However, the FCCs retention of a case-by-case approach to spectrum acquisition and the continuing revision upward of the spectrum screen may allow our competitors to make additional acquisitions of spectrum and further consolidate the industry. |
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