TBAC » Topics » Board of Directors Response to Stockholder Proposal

This excerpt taken from the TBAC DEF 14A filed Sep 22, 2006.
Board of Directors’ Response to Stockholder Proposal
 
The Board of Directors believes, and independent evidence suggests, that rights plans actually enhance value for stockholders. For example:
 
  •  According to the Investor Responsibility Reach Center, an independent source of impartial information on corporate governance and social responsibility issues, worldwide rights plans have been adopted by over 2,200 U.S. companies, consistent with an increasing number of studies demonstrating the economic benefits that rights plans provide for stockholders.
 
  •  Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., a major institutional stockholder advocacy group, commissioned a study released in February 2004 designed to test the correlation between corporate governance and stockholder value. The study found that companies with strong anti-takeover defenses, including rights plans, achieved higher stockholder returns of three-, five- and ten-year periods, higher return on equity, and higher performance on a number of other key financial and operating statistics.
 
  •  A study by J.P. Morgan (now JP Morgan Chase & Co.), a global financial services provider, published in 2001, analyzing 397 acquisitions of U.S. public companies from 1997 to 2000 where the purchase price exceeded $1 billion, found that companies with rights plans in place received a median premium of 35.9% compared to 31.9% for companies without a rights plan.
 
  •  In addition, a study published in 1997 by Georgeson & Company Inc. (now Georgeson Stockholder Communications, Inc.), a nationally recognized proxy solicitation and investor relations firm, analyzed takeover data between 1992 and 1996 to determine whether rights plans had any measurable impact on stockholder value. The study found that takeover premiums paid to target companies with rights plans were an average of eight percentage points higher than those paid to companies without rights plans, rights plans contributed an additional $13 billion in stockholder value in takeover situations over the study period, and stockholders of acquired companies without rights plans gave up $14.5 billion in potential premiums over the same period. The study also noted that the presence of a rights plan at a target company did not increase the likelihood of the withdrawal of a friendly takeover bid or the defeat of a hostile one, and did not reduce the likelihood of a company becoming a takeover target.
 
The Company’s current preferred share purchase rights plan (the “Rights Plan”) is designed to strengthen the Board of Directors’ ability, in the exercise of its fiduciary duties, to protect our stockholders’ interests and to ensure that each stockholder is treated fairly in any transaction that involves a change of control of the Company. The Rights Plan does not prevent suitors from making offers to the Board or our stockholders, nor is it a deterrent to a stockholder’s initiation of a proxy contest. Instead, it is designed to encourage potential purchasers to negotiate directly with the Board and to give the Board sufficient time to evaluate the merits of every takeover proposal it receives, consistent with its fiduciary duties. This affords the Board the ability to respond to acquisition proposals, and the ability to attempt to negotiate a higher bid from a suitor, and flexibility to develop and pursue alternatives that may better enhance stockholder value. The Board believes that as the elected representative of the stockholders, it is in the best position to assess the intrinsic value of the Company and to negotiate on behalf of all stockholders, evaluate the adequacy of any potential offer, and protect stockholders against potential abuses during the takeover process.
 
Potential takeover abuses that the Company’s Rights Plan is designed to protect against include the following:
 
  •  Compressed Time Frame — The traditional function of the Board of Directors is to act and negotiate in the best interest of and on behalf of the Company’s stockholders in connection with a merger or other business combination. The commencement of a tender offer, as opposed to negotiation with the Board of Directors,


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  could leave the Company with a highly compressed time frame for considering alternatives and no meaningful bargaining power to seek a higher price or better terms for stockholders.
 
  •  Creeping Tender Offer — By use of the so-called “creeping tender offer,” a potential hostile acquirer, through selective open-market purchases in which it offers different prices to different stockholders, could gain control of the Company without affording stockholders the protections of the Federal tender offer rules which require, among other things, that all stockholders receive the same price in a tender offer.
 
  •  Street Sweep — The commencement of a tender offer by a hostile acquiror could result in professional short-term stock traders (arbitrageurs) acquiring large numbers of shares. Once this takes place, the hostile acquiror could terminate the tender offer (possibly causing the stock price to fall) and “sweep the street,” thereby acquiring control from the arbitrageurs but leaving other public stockholders as minority stockholders.
 
  •  Partial Tender Offer — The takeover of the Company by a hostile acquiror through a creeping or partial tender offer would enable the hostile acquiror to take advantage of the public minority stockholders through self-dealing and conflict transactions or to squeeze out the public stockholders, forcing them to accept questionable securities.
 
The Company’s Rights Plan was adopted by the Board in order to enhance its ability, in a manner consistent with its fiduciary duties, to preserve and enhance the value of every stockholder’s investment in the Company. The Board carefully reviewed the arguments for and against adopting such a plan before making its decision and continues to periodically review the matter, in consultation with outside counsel, to consider whether maintaining the Rights Plan continues to be in the best interests of the Company’s stockholders. In fact, on October 18, 2005, the Board of Directors considered whether maintaining the Rights Plan was in the best interests of stockholders, and determined that it was. The Board of Directors, following receipt of this stockholder proposal, again considered whether maintaining the Rights Plan was in the best interests of stockholders, and determined that it was.
 
The Board of Directors believes redemption of the Rights Plan at this time would be premature and would remove any incentive for a potential purchaser to negotiate with the Board of Directors, leaving the stockholders unprotected from potentially coercive and unfair offers. In addition, the Company stockholders should understand that stockholder approval of the adoption or maintenance of our Rights Plan is not required by any applicable law, regulation or rule or any rule of The NASDAQ Stock Market. The stockholder approval process is long and costly, and a requirement to seek stockholder approval for a rights plan could seriously jeopardize the Company’s negotiating position and leverage in a hostile situation, leaving the stockholders vulnerable to coercive and unfair acquisition tactics.
 
Finally, it is not clear how giving up the important bargaining tool created by our Rights Plan would respond to any of the corporate governance issues raised by the proponent. The Board of Directors is comprised entirely of independent outside directors, with the exception of the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer. The Board of Directors believes that this independence, in conjunction with the requirement to maintain a majority of independent directors on the Board of Directors, and the Board of Directors’ duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of Company and its stockholders, provides adequate assurance against the Rights Plan being utilized for management entrenchment. In addition: the office of Chairman of the Board of Directors is separate from the office of President and is held by an independent director; all of the key committees of the Board of Directors consist solely of independent directors; we have adopted a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics applicable to the Board of Directors, a copy of which is posted on our website; and the Board evaluates its effectiveness and performance on an annual basis.
 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Board of Directors believes the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company’s stockholders and recommends a vote AGAINST it.


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